[{"id":1141,"title":"Stratified sortition for balancing representativeness and efficiency in large participatory institutions","sha":"49c23edcfeb6f95eb75f5af003c5fc24","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"As a self-governing institution grows, it becomes a target for elite capture. Sortition, or governance by lottery, is a mechanism displacing elites and for preserving democratic rule. A large legislature with randomly appointed representatives, or a small board with oversight over that legislature, can foreclose nepotism, rent-seeking, and other abuses. \r\n\r\nHowever, sortition in large institutions suffers from a tradeoff, particularly in resource-constrained institutions.  A small body of randomly appointed representatives can make decisions quickly and efficiently but, due to the high standard error of small samples, may not be representative. Conversely, the central limit theorem can ensure that a large body is representative, but it will need much more time and structure to reach decisions. \r\n\r\nIs it possible to ensure randomly appointed bodies that are both representative and efficient? We propose a stratified sortition, in which appointments are biased to ensure representative bodies.  An institution with intentionally biased random draws may be able to ensure appointed bodies that are both small and representative. Of course, it is important that the member data defining representativeness is robust to gaming. Stratified sortition will be less effective at preventing capture if members can tune their own \"metadata\" to improve their chances of selection.","created_at":"2023-07-25T18:54:35.995Z","updated_at":"2023-08-16T17:34:37.795Z","zenodo_id":8196235,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8196235","subject":null,"tags":["voting","democracy","sortition","sampling","governance","institutions"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":290,"title":"The End of the Party: A New Approach to Parliamentary Democracy","sha":"a3434d93b3ca29a526c03e6a2fdce309","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"Today’s party democracy suffers from two issues. First, members of parliament (MPs) should represent voters’ opinions. Yet their free mandate often suffers from obligations to vote in accordance with party interests and is therefore overridden by the group ([Cohen, 2003](http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2003-09138-003)). Second, due to selection processes, alignment with party policy facilitates success within that party ([Cox \u0026 McCubbins, 2007](https://books.google.de/books?id=gc1LkxwQtPIC)). However, those in power are not necessarily competent to solve current issues. Given the complexity of political issues, pooling expertise across party boundaries (similar to problem-oriented interdisciplinary science projects) therefore promises to be more fruitful.\r\n\r\nDecreasing membership figures point to voters’ disidentification with parties ([Van Biezen et al., 2012](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01995.x/abstract)). Furthermore, the amount of data necessary to cast informed votes overwhelms many individuals. Voting advice applications (VAA) matching voters’ opinions to parties increase voter turnout and voters' propensity to seek political information ([Ladner \u0026 Pianzola, 2010](https://hal.inria.fr/file/index/docid/1059097/filename/62290207.pdf)).\r\n\r\nVoters’ interests may be represented more accurately by extending the VAA approach such that, like on dating platforms, voters obtain a “matching index” for individual candidates (rather than entire parties) who represent their values, opinions, and political priorities best. Once elected, MPs can be flexibly grouped by their expertise for given tasks and issues, regardless of party boundaries. This approach may increase voters’ identification with politics, ensure independence of political representatives and, eventually, enhance the quality of political work.","created_at":"2016-03-15T16:36:10.287Z","updated_at":"2016-05-14T04:36:20.428Z","zenodo_id":102098,"doi":"http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.47699","subject":null,"tags":["politics","matching algorithms","participation","elections","vaa","voting advice applications","political parties","democracy"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null}]