[{"id":1189,"title":"Institutional Assimilation","sha":"6897a6ff9dec284d6c78b9e4501ae338","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"The role of social media companies in content moderation takes center stage in the Section 230 debate. Many conservatives believe that firms like Facebook are mimicking state authority by censoring speech (Frederick,2023).\r\n\r\nWhat if there is merit to this claim? By collaborating with the institutions of governance, private companies become an extension of the government.\r\n\r\nThis phenomenon is known as Institutional Assimilation. Through an organization aligning its conduct with the incentives of the government, it acts as a proxy. Acting as a surrogate for a government agency.\r\n\r\nInstitutional Assimilation subverts the traditional dichotomy of Pluralism and Elite Theory in political science (Gilens \u0026 Page, 2014). The faction within the coalition possessing leverage varies by situation. Regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971)would be an example of the conditions of the Section 230 debate in reverse. Lawmakers acting as stewards of corporate interests, become an extension of the firm.","created_at":"2024-04-01T17:52:02.946Z","updated_at":"2024-05-31T06:00:43.540Z","zenodo_id":11398242,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11398242","subject":null,"tags":["pressure group theory","political science","governance","institutions","organizations"],"vote_count":0,"view_count":1,"score":0.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":1043,"title":"Engine change at 80MPH: OSS projects as laboratories for participatory governance transformation","sha":"7f3b0cba0a67c0878a2c38a8c852d3a2","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"Online communities are high-throughput laboratories for governance change and innovation. Elinor Ostrom's idea of institutional diversity, that sustainable resource governance requires a diversity of governance forms and approaches, is well represented by the diversity and complexity of online regimes. One major challenge in the study of self-organized governance institutions is extending our understanding of incremental governance change processes to more transformative or even \"revolutionary\" changes. Because of their intermittency, revolutions are difficult to anticipate, isolate, induce, and therefore to systematically study. But online communities have constraints and structure that make them ideal for understanding governance transformation. This is especially true of open source software (OSS) project communities. Because of the nature of the peer-production of code, most successful OSS projects start as \"benevolent dictatorships\" and transfer to community governance only after becoming successful. By treating OSS projects as governance laboratories, with special attention to the evolution of benevolent dictatorships, we gain a unique platform for understanding institutional transformations into participatory and accessible forms of government.","created_at":"2023-01-23T22:35:26.571Z","updated_at":"2023-02-22T06:00:53.816Z","zenodo_id":7662881,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7662881","subject":null,"tags":["institutions","governance","oss","benevolent dictatorship","ostrom","resource management"],"vote_count":0,"view_count":1,"score":0.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":1141,"title":"Stratified sortition for balancing representativeness and efficiency in large participatory institutions","sha":"49c23edcfeb6f95eb75f5af003c5fc24","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"As a self-governing institution grows, it becomes a target for elite capture. Sortition, or governance by lottery, is a mechanism displacing elites and for preserving democratic rule. A large legislature with randomly appointed representatives, or a small board with oversight over that legislature, can foreclose nepotism, rent-seeking, and other abuses. \r\n\r\nHowever, sortition in large institutions suffers from a tradeoff, particularly in resource-constrained institutions.  A small body of randomly appointed representatives can make decisions quickly and efficiently but, due to the high standard error of small samples, may not be representative. Conversely, the central limit theorem can ensure that a large body is representative, but it will need much more time and structure to reach decisions. \r\n\r\nIs it possible to ensure randomly appointed bodies that are both representative and efficient? We propose a stratified sortition, in which appointments are biased to ensure representative bodies.  An institution with intentionally biased random draws may be able to ensure appointed bodies that are both small and representative. Of course, it is important that the member data defining representativeness is robust to gaming. Stratified sortition will be less effective at preventing capture if members can tune their own \"metadata\" to improve their chances of selection.","created_at":"2023-07-25T18:54:35.995Z","updated_at":"2023-08-16T17:34:37.795Z","zenodo_id":8196235,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8196235","subject":null,"tags":["voting","democracy","sortition","sampling","governance","institutions"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":1093,"title":"Protocol Society","sha":"7c294f66fae2352765ec79bf5b0c7966","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"The concept of “protocol society” is an invitation to see social structures through the lens of the protocol—a set of voluntary rules governing communication and conduct. Examples include monastic rules, cross-border financial systems, diplomatic rituals, Internet standards, and blockchain contracts. Protocols typically coexist with other kinds of social structures, such as states and markets, and they can be an enabling substrate for those structures, but protocols are not reducible to them. Recognizing the existence of protocol-based social ordering helps reveal underappreciated aspects of historical and present societies. Protocols can also serve as the basis of imagining possible social futures—particularly in the pursuit of societies less dependent on enforcement through state violence.","created_at":"2023-05-03T22:22:42.913Z","updated_at":"2023-08-03T04:46:37.395Z","zenodo_id":8019263,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8019263","subject":null,"tags":["governance","communication","political theory"],"vote_count":3,"view_count":1,"score":3.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null}]