[{"id":881,"title":"The Paradox of Implicit Logrolling","sha":"75823d878348dc6cfaf4e51e473b8aef","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"The process of Implicit Logrolling (Buchanan \u0026 Tullock,1962) is a form of indirect vote-trading that heavily relies on the bundling of wedge issues. By way of tying specific groupings of policies to attract targeted demographics of voters to a political platform. This political strategy is especially effective in capturing the commitment of single-issue voters. These voters need to tacitly accept the rest of the policies on the political platform to have their one area of interest acknowledged. This is why implicit logrolling is such an effective mechanism in shaping the American political landscape.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nMost analysts ignore how voters reconcile selecting programs and political candidates that hold logically inconsistent views. For example, an individual that defends abortion rights on the grounds of a bodily integrity argument concurrently favoring vaccine mandates. Here is where the Paradox of Implicit Logrolling comes in; voters then must rationalize these discrepancies due to the lack of logical consistency. In vote trading, the individual voter expects to make some concessions. However, when these concessions present logical and philosophical contradictions, few people question the conflict.  In short, the paradox describes how people are willing to accept contrary political positions if parceled with a party or policy they favor.\r\n","created_at":"2021-09-18T17:56:54.168Z","updated_at":"2021-11-01T11:43:11.353Z","zenodo_id":5606090,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5606090","subject":null,"tags":["public choice theory","james m. buchanan","gordon tullock","voting","implicit logrolling","vote-trading","calculus of consent"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":775,"title":"Dual-Role Actor- A Fresh Look At Bootlegger and Baptists Dynamics","sha":"6c16d34fb88d800ba24ebed18b1ba3df","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"Bruce Yandle’s concept of Bootleggers and Baptists explains how seemingly opposing groups/individuals join forces for a single cause. The Bootleggers stand to gain from advocating the assumed policy position. The Baptists provide moral justification for the policy stance. It is always assumed that these seemingly impossible coalitions need to be comprised of two factions. However, why can’t a single group or individual be a Bootlegger and a Baptist? The individual or group assuming a “dual-actor” role in supporting a specific position.\r\n\r\nThe idiomatic expression “it takes two to tango” is not a hard and fast rule for Bootleggers and Baptists coalition building dynamics.  A single economic agent can possess multiple motives for their actions, opinions, or desires. The possibility of subordinate motives lurking the background provides some credence to this postulation. For example, an individual can donate to charity out of concern for the poor.  Simultaneously, also want to donate to charity because it fosters a positive public image. Making the philanthropic citizen both a Bootlegger and Baptist. This alignment of opposing motives is analogous to a coalition being formed between the psychoanalytical ID and Superego. This can apply to individuals and the aggregate motives of the group.   \r\n","created_at":"2020-07-24T15:29:10.779Z","updated_at":"2020-07-26T06:00:57.737Z","zenodo_id":3960398,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3960398","subject":null,"tags":["public choice theory","bootlegger and baptists","bruce yandle"],"vote_count":0,"view_count":1,"score":0.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null}]