[{"id":447,"title":"Bayesian verdicts","sha":"c09a8265991caca80dfcb890abedf208","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"Why do juries emit binary verdicts, i.e. guilty or not guilty? Why not allow each juror to emit a \"Bayesian vote\" reflecting his/her subjective degree of belief in the probability of the defendant’s guilt? Under this alternative method of Bayesian voting, jurors would \"score\" the evidence presented by the parties at trial on a scale of 0 to 1 or some other scale. (Whatever scale is used, the higher one’s score, the greater the one’s subjective degree of belief in the defendant’s guilt, while a midpoint score, such as 0.5, means the juror is undecided about the question of guilt.) Such a simple system of scoring would then produce a numerical verdict, a Bayesian verdict, consisting of an average value or sum total of the jurors’ individual scores. Under this method of voting, the moving party would prevail only if the average value or sum total, as the case may be, of the jury’s collective score exceeds some critical threshold value.","created_at":"2018-03-01T05:34:51.418Z","updated_at":"2020-07-29T00:57:45.655Z","zenodo_id":1186977,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1186977","subject":null,"tags":["degree of belief","probability","juries","voting","bayes"],"vote_count":2,"view_count":1,"score":2.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":1141,"title":"Stratified sortition for balancing representativeness and efficiency in large participatory institutions","sha":"49c23edcfeb6f95eb75f5af003c5fc24","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"As a self-governing institution grows, it becomes a target for elite capture. Sortition, or governance by lottery, is a mechanism displacing elites and for preserving democratic rule. A large legislature with randomly appointed representatives, or a small board with oversight over that legislature, can foreclose nepotism, rent-seeking, and other abuses. \r\n\r\nHowever, sortition in large institutions suffers from a tradeoff, particularly in resource-constrained institutions.  A small body of randomly appointed representatives can make decisions quickly and efficiently but, due to the high standard error of small samples, may not be representative. Conversely, the central limit theorem can ensure that a large body is representative, but it will need much more time and structure to reach decisions. \r\n\r\nIs it possible to ensure randomly appointed bodies that are both representative and efficient? We propose a stratified sortition, in which appointments are biased to ensure representative bodies.  An institution with intentionally biased random draws may be able to ensure appointed bodies that are both small and representative. Of course, it is important that the member data defining representativeness is robust to gaming. Stratified sortition will be less effective at preventing capture if members can tune their own \"metadata\" to improve their chances of selection.","created_at":"2023-07-25T18:54:35.995Z","updated_at":"2023-08-16T17:34:37.795Z","zenodo_id":8196235,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8196235","subject":null,"tags":["voting","democracy","sortition","sampling","governance","institutions"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":881,"title":"The Paradox of Implicit Logrolling","sha":"75823d878348dc6cfaf4e51e473b8aef","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"The process of Implicit Logrolling (Buchanan \u0026 Tullock,1962) is a form of indirect vote-trading that heavily relies on the bundling of wedge issues. By way of tying specific groupings of policies to attract targeted demographics of voters to a political platform. This political strategy is especially effective in capturing the commitment of single-issue voters. These voters need to tacitly accept the rest of the policies on the political platform to have their one area of interest acknowledged. This is why implicit logrolling is such an effective mechanism in shaping the American political landscape.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nMost analysts ignore how voters reconcile selecting programs and political candidates that hold logically inconsistent views. For example, an individual that defends abortion rights on the grounds of a bodily integrity argument concurrently favoring vaccine mandates. Here is where the Paradox of Implicit Logrolling comes in; voters then must rationalize these discrepancies due to the lack of logical consistency. In vote trading, the individual voter expects to make some concessions. However, when these concessions present logical and philosophical contradictions, few people question the conflict.  In short, the paradox describes how people are willing to accept contrary political positions if parceled with a party or policy they favor.\r\n","created_at":"2021-09-18T17:56:54.168Z","updated_at":"2021-11-01T11:43:11.353Z","zenodo_id":5606090,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5606090","subject":null,"tags":["public choice theory","james m. buchanan","gordon tullock","voting","implicit logrolling","vote-trading","calculus of consent"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":935,"title":"Menu-Board Theory of Voting","sha":"89bb974c2efeff5c73437c6c4f7dcd61","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"The dictum of Public Choice Theory is that politics functions as a form of exchange. This assertion is very much true of the process of voting, where participants either select policies or representatives to make policy decisions. Public policy is nothing about purchasing decisions. Any commodity or service provided by the state is a public good. The government provides services that the private sector cannot otherwise supply due to practicality or legal sanctions.\r\n\r\nThe suggestion that voting is a form of purchasing public commodities and services (e.g. roadways and defense) validates the Menu-Board Theory of Voting. This theory suggests that anytime political decisions are made through a democratic process it is analogous to ordering food from a fast-food restaurant.  The clearest example of this is the Marijuana legalization referendums in the United States.  Through voting to legalize the sale and consumption, voters are not just purchasing the right to ingest cannabis, but they also acquire other complementary public goods (the proverbial fries and a drink). Voters also gain regulations from the state government to reduce the spillover effects of consumers ingesting unsafe products.  Also, additional tax revenue from the excise taxes will serve as funding for other services.","created_at":"2022-04-25T20:43:16.078Z","updated_at":"2022-06-15T06:00:38.199Z","zenodo_id":6643873,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6643873","subject":null,"tags":["economics","politics","public choice","voting"],"vote_count":0,"view_count":1,"score":0.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":388,"title":"An algorithm to end gerrymandering","sha":"1bd10c15e9151e2551f8a1e3817af0f5","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"U.S. House of Representative districts are bounded by centuries-old state borders, and redrawn by state legislatures. This has led to constitutional problems, and overcoming the problem of gerrymandering has not gone away. I propose a distance-weighted voting algorithm where any citizen can vote for any candidate in the country, and the 435 candidates with the highest weighted aggregate votes will become congresspeople. A Voronoi diagram will be used to partition the country into districts. The weighting scheme will encourage people to vote for candidates who are geographically close to them, but gives the option of voting for someone far away, with a distance penalty of, say, 1/d. For example, if someone votes for a person who is 1 mile away, they contribute is 1/1 = 1 vote. If someone votes for a person who is 100 miles away, that is 1/100 = 0.01 votes. At the end, all votes are summed, and the top 435 candidates win. \r\nThis algorithm will reduce gerrymandering, weaken tribalism, and continuously update borders in a data-driven way. \r\nFuture work will involve methods to outright dissolve the Senate, as it is based on an irrelevant 226-year-old compromise based on lines drawn by European aristocrats. ","created_at":"2017-05-26T23:27:35.077Z","updated_at":"2019-04-29T10:01:16.584Z","zenodo_id":800515,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.800515","subject":null,"tags":["algorithms","voting","government"],"vote_count":3,"view_count":1,"score":3.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null}]