[{"id":1040,"title":"A distinction between the organizational and institutional approaches to human collectives","sha":"bfc22ab2fd214a4956fd24e9cda055f1","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"What is the difference between institutions and organizations? Is there even any need for a distinction? A simple definition makes the need for both concepts clear:\r\nOrganizations are collectives whose members mobilize diverse resources toward a shared goal, while institutions are collectives whose members mobilize shared resources toward diverse goals.\r\nThese definitions explain why both attract bounded rational choice theory in different ways. Rational choice tools like game theory and decision theory have been fundamental in the development of both organizations and institutions, but institutional constraints center game theory for explaining member behavior, as finite resources become an arena for strategic contests, while organizational constraints center decision theoretic explanations, as the shared goal, whether the cause or result of aligned incentives, reduces the power of interpersonal strategy to explain behavior. These definitions also explain why it is meaningful to treat organizations and not institutions as coherent agents capable of their own decision making, and why Wikipedia attracts both lenses. With editors constrained both by the encyclopedia's goal and collective action challenges to maintaining it, Wikipedia and other peer production institutions stand out as hybrids that can help scholars reconcile and integrate the institutional and organizational approaches to human collectives.","created_at":"2023-01-14T08:26:23.243Z","updated_at":"2023-02-07T02:05:30.705Z","zenodo_id":7539360,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7539360","subject":null,"tags":["organization theory","institutional analysis","herbert simon","elinor ostrom","behavioral science","rational choice"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":1043,"title":"Engine change at 80MPH: OSS projects as laboratories for participatory governance transformation","sha":"7f3b0cba0a67c0878a2c38a8c852d3a2","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"Online communities are high-throughput laboratories for governance change and innovation. Elinor Ostrom's idea of institutional diversity, that sustainable resource governance requires a diversity of governance forms and approaches, is well represented by the diversity and complexity of online regimes. One major challenge in the study of self-organized governance institutions is extending our understanding of incremental governance change processes to more transformative or even \"revolutionary\" changes. Because of their intermittency, revolutions are difficult to anticipate, isolate, induce, and therefore to systematically study. But online communities have constraints and structure that make them ideal for understanding governance transformation. This is especially true of open source software (OSS) project communities. Because of the nature of the peer-production of code, most successful OSS projects start as \"benevolent dictatorships\" and transfer to community governance only after becoming successful. By treating OSS projects as governance laboratories, with special attention to the evolution of benevolent dictatorships, we gain a unique platform for understanding institutional transformations into participatory and accessible forms of government.","created_at":"2023-01-23T22:35:26.571Z","updated_at":"2023-02-22T06:00:53.816Z","zenodo_id":7662881,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7662881","subject":null,"tags":["institutions","governance","oss","benevolent dictatorship","ostrom","resource management"],"vote_count":0,"view_count":1,"score":0.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":true,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null},{"id":1141,"title":"Stratified sortition for balancing representativeness and efficiency in large participatory institutions","sha":"49c23edcfeb6f95eb75f5af003c5fc24","user_id":null,"state":"published","body":"As a self-governing institution grows, it becomes a target for elite capture. Sortition, or governance by lottery, is a mechanism displacing elites and for preserving democratic rule. A large legislature with randomly appointed representatives, or a small board with oversight over that legislature, can foreclose nepotism, rent-seeking, and other abuses. \r\n\r\nHowever, sortition in large institutions suffers from a tradeoff, particularly in resource-constrained institutions.  A small body of randomly appointed representatives can make decisions quickly and efficiently but, due to the high standard error of small samples, may not be representative. Conversely, the central limit theorem can ensure that a large body is representative, but it will need much more time and structure to reach decisions. \r\n\r\nIs it possible to ensure randomly appointed bodies that are both representative and efficient? We propose a stratified sortition, in which appointments are biased to ensure representative bodies.  An institution with intentionally biased random draws may be able to ensure appointed bodies that are both small and representative. Of course, it is important that the member data defining representativeness is robust to gaming. Stratified sortition will be less effective at preventing capture if members can tune their own \"metadata\" to improve their chances of selection.","created_at":"2023-07-25T18:54:35.995Z","updated_at":"2023-08-16T17:34:37.795Z","zenodo_id":8196235,"doi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8196235","subject":null,"tags":["voting","democracy","sortition","sampling","governance","institutions"],"vote_count":1,"view_count":1,"score":1.1,"deleted":false,"muted":false,"tweeted":false,"attachment_file_name":null,"attachment_content_type":null,"attachment_file_size":null,"attachment_updated_at":null}]